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1 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
Recent economic studies on government behaviour often assume that govern- 
ments aim to stay in power. In such studies, the relationship between the popu- 
larity of the incumbent U.S. President (or party) and economic variables is 
obviously a very important one. Since the first studies on vote and popularity 
functions appeared, estimations of these functions have been based on the 
hypothesis that voters hold the incumbent President responsible for economic 
outcomes. Evidence on voting behaviour has only provided weak support for 
this hypothesis. Different studies have found different economic variables in- 
fluencing the popularity of a President. Moreover, the popularity and vote 
functions appeared to be very unstable. Nevertheless, this hypothesis has ac- 
quired an established position in studies on government behaviour. 
In the present paper a new hypothesis on voting behaviour is formulated and 
tested for the United States. Following most previous studies, voters are as- 
sumed to be ignorant about the working of the economy. Voters do, however, 
perceive ideological differences between political parties. From these assump- 
tions, the alternative hypothesis can be derived that the popularity of a Presi- 
dent (or party) depends on the problems a country faces. According to this 
hypothesis, a President does not necessarily benefit from favourable conomic 
outcomes. Instead, he benefits from economic problems if voters believe he can 
handle them better than his opponents. A comparison of the estimates of the 
conventional nd alternative hypothesis turns out in favour of the alternative 
one. 
This paper is organized as follows. It starts with a short review of the litera- 
ture on popularity and vote functions. It appears that in existing studies, a 
plausible explanation of how voters' expectations regarding the performance 
of Presidential candidates are formed has been lacking. In section 3, we try to 
gain a clear understanding of voters' expectations by posing the question: 
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'What do voters know about he economic policy problem?' In answering this 
question we use Theil's formulation of the economic policy problem. In this 
section an alternative hypothesis formulated, viz. that the popularity of a 
President depends on the problems acountry faces. In section 4, this hypothe- 
sis and the conventional hypothesis are tested for the United States for the post- 
war period. It appears that he data do not support the old hypothesis atall, but 
that they provide strong support for the alternative hypothesis. The acceptance 
of the alternative hypothesis has important implications for existing studies on 
government behaviour. Section 5 describes ome promising directions for fur- 
ther research. Section 6, finally, concludes this paper. 
2 A SHORT REVIEW 
Following Mueller (1970), Goodhart and Bhansali (1970) and Kramer (1971), 
numerous studies have examined the relationship between the performance of
administrations and their popularity. The studies in this field are generally em- 
pirically oriented, trying to give support to the hypothesis that voters hold the 
incumbent party (or President) responsible for economic developments. In 
what follows this hypothesis will be referred to as the 'score hypothesis.' 
Usually, the equations derived from the score hypothesis have the following 
form (Paldam, 1981) 
popt =f (g l  t gl . . . . .  g~ gY-k, . . . . . . . .  t -k  . . . . . . . .  
pl ........ pit_m, , pn n t "'" t . . . . . . . .  P t -m)"  (1) 
where pop is a popularity index, ga to gn are economic explanatory variables 
and pl to pn are political explanatory variables. 
On the basis of the popularity index we can distinguish two types of func- 
tions, viz. the vote and the popularity functions. The former explains election 
results and the latter explains the popularity of a President as measured by 
polls. There are some obvious differences between vote and popularity func- 
tions. Later, in discussing the empirical results we will return to these differ- 
ences. For the moment, we primarily focus on popularity functions. 
Unemployment, inflation and disposable income are frequently used as 
variables representing economic onditions (g i ) .  Rising unemployment and in- 
flation are supposed to diminish the popularity of a President while a growing 
disposable income is supposed to augment the popularity of a President. No 
clarity exists on the proper specification of these variables. Questions uch as 
'Is the popularity of a President affected by the level of unemployment or by 
its change?' are still unanswered. 
Factors affecting the popularity of a President that are not related to econo- 
mic conditions are called political factors (p i ) .  Since these factors are often 
hard to quantify, they are usually represented by dummy variables. Various 
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political variables have appeared in previous tudies on popularity functions. 
Dummy variables are often introduced to represent the personality of a Presi- 
dent (Goodhart and Bhansali, 1970; Mueller, 1970; Frey and Schneider, 1978a 
and 1978b; Hibbs, 1982; Chappell, 1983). In popularity functions for the 
United States a dummy for the Watergate scandal is sometimes included (Frey 
and Schneider, 1978a and 1978b; Hibbs, 1982). Other political factors often 
appearing are a 'rally round the flag' variable reflecting the observation that 
the popularity of a President increases during international crises (Mueller, 
1970; Hibbs, 1982) and a 'honeymoon' variable which indicates that the popu- 
larity of a President usually increases just after his election (Frey and Schneider, 
1978; Mosley, 1984). 
Most estimates of popularity and vote functions lend support o the hypo- 
thesis that the popularity of a President is related to economic onditions (cf. 
Paldam, 1981; Van Winden, 1983). Unfortunately, the various results do not 
speak in one voice. For the United States, inflation is the only variable which 
is generally found to influence the popularity of a President significantly. On 
the contrary, unemployment and disposable income are sometimes found not 
to be related to the popularity index. Moreover, some studies suggest hat 
popularity functions are rather unstable (cf. Paldam, 1981; Van Winden, 1983; 
Mosley, 1984). By cutting the estimation period into slices it can be shown that 
in some periods the economic variables usually considered have no significant 
influence on the popularity of a President or even have coefficients with an 
unexpected sign. 
In the pioneering studies on vote and popularity functions a theoretical 
framework has been lacking. The equations to be estimated have been based on 
some general empirical notions. Fair (1978) first tried to develop a voter's- 
choice model. The idea behind his model is quite simple. Voters are assumed to 
maximise their expected utility, which depends on the expected performance of
the incumbent President and a loyalty term specific to each voter. The loyalty 
term in Fair's model represents he loyalty of a voter to the incumbent party or 
the President. Fair assumes that the differences of loyalty to parties are evenly 
distributed across voters. In Fair's model voters' expectations on the perfor- 
mance of Presidents are formed rather primitively. The present and past values 
of a few economic indicators erve as a proxy for the expected performance of
a President. 
This view on the voter has been criticized in two ways. First, some authors 
even view a voter as less sophisticated, regarding voters as being ignorant about 
economic issues (cf. Edwards, 1983; Mosley, 1984). According to these authors 
it is important o realize that voters receive their information on economic 
issues from papers and magazines. This information is very limited since these 
media only pay attention to economic rises. Hence, it is concluded that voters 
only react on economic variables if they are above their crisis levels. This line 
of arguing seems to provide a reasonable explanation for the instability of vote 
and popularity functions. Second, Chappell (1983) and MacRae (1977 and 
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1981) assume a more sophisticated voter than Fair. They assume a strategic 
voter who maximises his utility, taking into account the future consequences of 
past and present policies. Chappell has found that the 'sophisticated voter 
hypothesis' does a better job of explaining the popularity of a President than 
the 'naive voter hypothesis.' MacRae's results are in line with Chappell's 
findings. 
The previous paragraphs show that both a model with a less sophisticated 
voter and a model with a more sophisticated voter improve Fair's model. From 
the existing empirical results, it is apparently hard to detect how voters' expec- 
tations are actually formed. 
Borooah and Van der Ploeg (1983) have adopted Fair's model but they 
assume that the loyalty term is logistically distributed. The shape of the 
logistic disti'ibution is in accordance with the conventional view that a polit- 
ical party has strong supporters having a high loyalty to their party and 
weak supporters having a low loyalty to their party. In fact, the weak sup- 
porters of all parties can be regarded as the floating voters, who are supposed to 
react upon changing economic onditions (see also Hanushek and Jackson, 
1977 and Van Winden, 1983). The logit model has the additional advantage 
that it enables us to analyse multi-party systems (see also Renaud and Van 
Winden, 1987). 
The theoretical underpinning of the vote and popularity function has not led 
to quite different empirical results. The equations estimated by e.g. Borooah 
and Van der Ploeg (1983) are in principle equal to those of Kramer (1971). 
However, the choice model sharpens our intuition. It facilitates detecting the 
main pitfalls of the vote and popularity functions. 
From the discussion above two conclusions can be drawn. First, a plausible 
explanation of how voters' expectations are formed regarding the performance 
of parties or Presidents is still lacking. Second, most estimates of popularity 
and vote functions uggest that such functions are rather unstable. 
3 VOTERS' EXPECTATIONS 
As we have seen in the previous section, in modelling voting behaviour the 
crucial problem is the determination f voters' expectations regarding the per- 
formance of a President. A question closely connected with this problem is 
'What do voters know about the economic policy problem?' In order to pro- 
vide a clear picture of the possible answers to this question and to facilitate the 
judgment of  the plausibility of these answers, the traditional formulation of 
the economic policy problem is a convenient starting point. 
Theil (1958) has formulated the problem of economic policy as minimising 
a quadratic ost function subject o restrictions reflecting the perceived work- 
ing of the economy. The cost function comprises target and instrument 
variables in deviation from their desired values. The variables frequently used 
in vote and popularity functions oftefi appear in cost functions. We can for- 
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malize the economic policy problem with two target variables as follows: 
minimise (x) C = t~l(u- ud) 2 + (1 - a l )p  2 + ~'2 X2 (2) 
subject o u,p =f(x ,  s) (3) 
yields x = g(t~i, ud, s ) and u,p= h( f ( .  ),ai, ud, s) (4) 
where the coefficients ai represent the preference scheme of the policy-makers, 
u is the unemployment rate, ud is the ideal value of the unemployment rate, p 
is the inflation, x is a vector of instrument variables and s is a vector of non- 
controllable variables. Solving the economic policy problem shows that the 
economic outcomes u and p depend on the preference scheme of the policy- 
makers, the ideal values of all variables, the values of non-controllable variables 
and, of course, the working of the economy, f ( .  ).1 
Let us now use this framework to describe the way voter's expectations 
regarding the performance of a President are determined. As appeared from 
the previous section, in pioneering studies on voting behaviour voters base 
their choices on present values of u and p, neglecting the factors which have 
led to these values. The policy framework suggests that the values of u and 
p provide a poor indication for their future values since they ignore the in- 
fluence of non-controllable variables, the preference scheme of the policy 
makers and the working of the economy. As we have discussed, Chappell 
(1983) and MacRae (1977 and 1981) have assumed a more sophisticated voter, 
being aware of the short-run and long-run trade-offs between economic target 
variables. In terms of the economic policy framework, the voter is assumed to 
know the working of the economy (equation 3). Hence, in judging the expected 
performance of a President he voter is assumed to be able to consider the 
future consequences of past and present policies. Voters' expectations regard- 
ing u and p are still a bit naive, since future policies are not taken into con- 
sideration. As far as we know, there are no studies published yet which assume 
that voters have different perceptions about the preference schemes of 
Presidents. 
The assumption that voters are naive may run counter to the intuition of 
economists who generally assume individual rationality (Chappell, 1983). 
However, the naive voter hypothesis i not necessarily in contradiction with the 
rational voter hypothesis. To illustrate this we reconsider the voter's-choice 
model. The voter's-choice model is based on the assumption that voters maxi- 
mise their utility through their votes. In a two-party system a voter elects for 
President D if his expected utility under President D is higher than his expected 
1 In fact, f(. ) describes the perceived working of the economy, while economic outcomes depend 
on the actual working of the economy. As the economic policy framework only serves illustrative 
purposes inthis paper we have ignored this complication. 
PRESIDENTIAL POPULARITY AND REPUTATION 173 
utility under President R
E(Vi D) > E(Vi R) ~ voter i elects President D 
(5) 
E(Vi R) > E(Vi D) = voter i elects President R, 
where E(V/) is voter i's expected utility under President j. If voter i 's know- 
ledge about economic policy is limited, his expectations about future outcomes 
may differ from the expectations he would have under complete knowledge. 
Hence a not fully informed voter risks voting for a President under whose 
administration his utility would be lower than under that of the President's 
opponent. We call this a 'wrong' vote. Furthermore, we assume that voters 
have the possibility to acquire knowledge of economic policy against certain 
costs (disutility). The voter's problem is now formulated as "how much know- 
ledge to acquire to avoid a 'wrong' vote." The solution of this problem is quite 
obvious. In general, the influence of an individual vote is negligible since, in 
many democratic countries, the election outcomes depend on millions of votes. 
A voter's 'wrong' vote does not decrease his utility, since the election outcomes 
are not changed by it. So, a voter has no incentive to increase his knowledge of 
economic issues since the possible benefits derived from it never exceed the 
costs of acquiring knowledge. It emerges that the assumption that voters 
understand the structure of the economy (Chappell, 1983; MacRae 1877 and 
1981) is rather implausible. Economists disagree about the working of the 
economic system. From this point of view we cannot expect hat voters know 
all answers. 
In previous tudies on voting behaviour the main point of controversy has 
been voters' knowledge of the economic system. Theil's framework tells us that 
there is another aspect of the economic policy process on which voters might 
base their expectations regarding the performance of President candidates viz. 
the preference schemes of President candidates. In Theil's framework different 
preference schemes of President candidates would imply that the values of ai 
depend on the President in office. In other words, the values of ai indicate 
the President's ideological characteristics. If voters are assumed to have 
knowledge of the values of ai they are considered to be able to perceive 
ideological differences between President candidates. 
There is evidence in favour of the hypothesis that Presidents from different 
parties have different preference schemes. Hibbs (1977 and 1986) has shown 
that macro-economic outcomes can partly be explained by the political colour 
of the President in power. For the United States he has found that under a 
Democratic administration unemployment is about 2 percentage points lower 
than under a Republican administration. Beck (1982) has estimated a much 
weaker elationship; an impact of political party on unemployment of about 1 
percent. Furthermore he has found that the relationship is rather unstable. We 
need not be surprised by this result. Theil's framework shows that the pref- 
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erence scheme of a President is only one of the many variables affecting econo- 
mic outcomes. 
The basic idea behind the relationship between economic outcomes and the 
colour of a President is that the core members of the parties in the United States 
have some specific features with respect to their social backgrounds and inter- 
ests. Strong supporters of the Democratic party often belong to the lower clas- 
ses, which generally express a great fear about unemployment. On the other 
hand the core constituency of the Republican party consists of upper classes, 
holding a relatively large share of capital. These classes uffer more from infla- 
tion than from unemployment. The suggestion emerges that the parties in the 
United States have different priorities. The Democratic party assigns higher 
priority to fighting unemployment and the Republican party assigns higher pri- 
ority to suppressing inflation. In Theil's framework we can formalize this as 
follows 
(6) 
; represents he costs attached to deviations of the unemployment rate where al
from its desired value by President i, and 1 - a[ is the costs attached to inflation 
by President i. For the economic outcomes (6) has important implications. It
leads to the hypothesis that different parties perform better on different issues. 
In the proceeding this hypothesis will be referred to as the 'issue hypothesis.' 
Under the assumption that voters perceive quation 6 - and this assumption is
quite plausible since (6) is based on voters' characteristics - voters' President 
choices depend on the economic problems a country faces. Note that this does 
not require that voters know the exact values of a i. For the United States the 
issue hypothesis means that the popularity of a Democratic (Republican) Presi- 
dent is positively (negatively) related to unemployment and negatively (positive- 
ly) related to inflation. In other words, in periods of high unemployment 
(inflation) the call for a Democratic (Republican) President will be greater. 
The issue hypothesis sharply contrasts with the score hypothesis that voters 
hold the incumbent President responsible for economic outcomes. The score 
hypothesis has led to equations of the following form 
popt  =/ /ob l t+/ / lP t  + .. where//o < 0 and [11 < O. (7) 
Equation 7 expresses that the popularity of the incumbent President is nega- 
tively related to unemployment and inflation, regardless of whether there is a 
Democratic or a Republican President in power. The issue hypothesis can be 
formalised as follows 
pop t = f lo (dem t u t - (1 - demt)ut )  +//1 (demtpt  - (1 - demt)Pt )  + . . ,  (8) 
where dem is a dummy variable taking the value I when a Democratic President 
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is in office and taking the value 0 when a Republican President is in office. In 
equation 8 the direction of the impact of unemployment and inflation on the 
popularity of the incumbent President depends on whether there is a Repub- 
lican or a Democratic President in power. I f  voters believe that Democrats 
assign higher priority to reducing unemployment than Republicans we expect 
that ,80 > 0 and fit < O. 
4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In this section we present estimates of popularity functions for the United 
States for the post-war period (1955-1986). As dependent variable serve the 
answers to the well-known Gallup-poll question 'Do you approve or dis- 
approve of the way [name of President] is handling his job as President?.' Fol- 
lowing several studies on voting behaviour, we assume that the approval rates 
(pop) are logistically distributed: 
popt = 1/(1 + e-X'P), (9) 
where x is a vector of independent variables and fl is a vector of coefficients. 
The logit model can be written as 
L = log(pop/(l -pop))  = xt f l .  (io) 
The logit model is heteroscedastic s nce the variance of the error term depends 
on xt. The equations in this section are therefore stimated with generalized 
least squares. All functions are estimated with annual data. 2 This has the ad- 
vantage that we get rid of short-run fluctuations in Presidential popularity 
resulting from, for example, good or bad performance of the President on tele- 
vision. On the other hand, by using annual data the number of degrees of free- 
dom decreases. As a result, we cannot use many independent variables. 
With regard to the political explanatory variables we have confined ourselves 
to the following variables. First, we introduce a dummy variable (EIS) to 
account for Eisenhower's unique personality. Among post-war Presidents 
Eisenhower took a unique position since his popularity was partly independent 
of his involvement in partisan politics (Edwards, 1983). Similar dummy 
variables are introduced for the periods in which Nixon and Reagan were in 
office (NIX resp. REA). 3 Finally, we introduce a dummy variable to account 
for the impact of the Watergate scandal on Nixon's popularity. The dummy 
(WAT) takes the value 1 over the period 1973-1974, and is 0 otherwise. The 
economic variables include unemployment (u) and inflation (p). 
2 The approval rates are converted from monthly to annual using averaging. 
3 We experimented with dummy variables for all Presidents and eliminated them from the equa- 
tion if they took low t-values (in general t-values less than unity). 
176 O.H. SWANK 
4.1 Testing the Score Hypothesis 
In order to test the score hypothesis we estimate 
L t = flo Pt + fll ut + ,62 WA T+ f13 EIS + ,84 N IX  + f15 REA.  (11) 
The estimation results are presented in the first column of Table 1. The results 
do not give much support o the score hypothesis. Only the coefficient for in- 
flation has the expected sign and is significant at a 5 percent level. The relation- 
ship between popularity and unemployment appears to be a positive one, which 
is clearly inconsistent with the score hypothesis. The coefficient for the 
Watergate dummy gets the expected sign, but is insignificant at conventional 
levels. We have experimented with slightly different specifications but found 
no specification supporting the score hypothesis. This is not really surprising. 
Several studies have found only weak and sometimes unexpected relations be- 
tween popularity and economic variables. 
4.2 Testing the Issue Hypothesis 
To test the issue hypothesis we estimate 
L t = flo(dem u t - (1 - dem)) u t +,61 (dem Pt - (1 - dem)pt)  
+ f12 WA T+ f13 EIS + ,84 N IX  + f12 REA.  (12) 
The second column of Table 1 reports the estimation results. The estimates pro- 
vide strong support o the issue hypothesis. All coefficients have the expected 
sign and are highly significant. Our findings suggest hat Democrats benefit 
from rising unemployment and Republicans from rising inflation, regardless 
the political colour of the incumbent President. 
TABLE 1 - WEIGHTED LEAST SQUARE ESTIMATES OF POPULARITY FUNCTIONS 
FOR THE UNITED STATES FOR 1955-1986 (DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS Lt) 
Score hypothesis Issue hypothesis 
Pt -0.117 (-3.108) 
(demtpt- (1- demt)pt -0.171 (-7.780) 
ut 0.126 (3.606) 
demtut- (1-demt)ut  0.192 (9.460) 
WAT -0.336 (-0.931) -0.976 (-4.660) 
EIS 0.279 (1.381) 1.184 (10.079) 
NIX  0.105 (0.493) 0.293 (2.360) 
REd -0.362 (-1.097) 1.400 (7.294) 
R z 0.413 0.802 
DW 1.492 1.686 
The figures in parentheses are t-values. 
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Our finding that high unemployment helps the Democrats and hurts the 
Republicans has also been found by Meltzer and Vellrath (1975). Unfortunate- 
ly, they do not relate this outcome to voters' expectations regarding party per- 
formance. In their article Meltzer and Vellrath conclude: 
'As in sample surveys, we find that the influence of variables hifts, 
presumably with the importance voters assign to a particular issue. The 
performance of the economy was, by our criteria, no worse in 1960 than 
in 1972. Inflation was much higher - 4.1 compared to 1.2 - and average 
unemployment about the same in 1972 and 1960. Yet the same Republi- 
can candidate can be described as having lost the earlier election and 
won the later election on the issues of prosperity and inflation.' 
Now we are able to understand these - at first glance counterintuitive - elec- 
tion outcomes. The issue hypothesis, supported by the data, tells us that the 
Republican candidate did not win the elections of 1972 in spite of inflation, but 
rather thanks to inflation. 
Comparing the estimates of the popularity function specified according to 
the score hypothesis and our hypothesis turns out doubtlessly in favour of our 
hypothesis. 
Our study raises the question of to what extent our findings are specific to the 
US. For The Netherlands a similar hypothesis to the issue hypothesis was re- 
jected by Peeperkorn and Steenkamp (1986), who studied the popularity of 
Dutch coalitions. In contrast to this study, Swank (1989) found empirical sup- 
port for the issue hypothesis nexplaining the popularity of Dutch political par- 
ties. An explanation for these conflicting results might be that coalitions differ 
less with respect to ideology than political parties. Future research must tell us 
whether the issue hypothesis i also valid for other countries. 
In the theoretical part of this paper, we have disregarded the differences be- 
tween vote and popularity functions. There are, however, some differences be- 
tween these functions which might be of importance for the interpretation of
the empirical results. Elections are preceded by campaigns, informing (or mis- 
informing) voters on a lot of issues. On the other hand, when opinion polls are 
taken, voters are considered to react within a few minutes. Another important 
difference between vote and popularity functions is the meaning of the re- 
sponses. Election outcomes provide more information than approval rates. If 
voter i elects for President j , this tells us that voter i expects that his utility will 
be optimal if President j will win the election. This implicity provides informa- 
tion about President j ' s  opponent. On the other hand, if the same voter ap- 
proves the stance of President j ,  this does not tell us anything about the 
expected performance of other candidates. The voter might still prefer can- 
didate i, though he approves the stance of President j .
According to the issue hypothesis on voting behaviour, voters compare poli- 
tical parties in determining their vote. This hypothesis connects closer to the ex- 
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planation of vote functions than to the explanation of popularity functions. 
Hence we expect hat we are also able to explain vote functions with the new 
hypothesis. Apart from the differences between vote and popularity functions 
mentioned above, it is generally accepted that vote and popularity functions 
are closely related to each other (Paldam, 1981). 
5 SOME IMPLICATIONS OF ACCEPT ING THE ISSUE HYPOTHESIS FOR STUDIES ON 
GOVERNMENT BEHAVIOUR 
The results obtained in the previous ection induce future research in two fields 
particularly: first, research into the implications of our findings for studies on 
government behaviour which use popularity or vote functions, second, re- 
search into the factors determining the reputation of political parties. It is far 
beyond the scope of the present article to discuss both these areas of research 
extensively. Therefore we confine ourselves to mentioning some promising 
directions for further research. 
The basic idea underlying the issue hypothesis that approval rates depend on 
the economic problems which a country faces is that voters believe that differ- 
ent parties perform better on different issues. This concept is obviously related 
to the reputation of political parties with regard to economic policy. In esti- 
mating popularity functions for the United States, we have implicitly assumed 
that the reputation of a political party is fairly constant over time. The question 
arises of whether this assumption is plausible. 
The reputation of a political party concerns the extent o which that party 
seems to pursue the ideological goals its core constituency desires. Hence repu- 
tation is closely related to the ideology of a party. As we have discussed in sec- 
tion 3, the ideology of a political party can be represented by preference 
schemes. It seems rather unrealistic to assume voters to know such preference 
schemes exactly. Small changes in the preference scheme of a party may not 
change the reputation of that party. Voters, probably, do not even notice small 
changes in ideology. On the other hand, the probability of sudden large 
changes in ideology seems negligible, at least in most Western democracies 
where political parties and social classes are closely related to each other. The 
core constituency of parties can be expected to exert pressure when the politi- 
cians strongly deviate from traditional paths, if such deviations harm the in- 
terests of the core constituency. 
In the preceding sections we have found that political parties must act in con- 
trast to their ideology if they want to increase their chances of reelection. In 
other words, they must stake reputation. Policy makers may aim to be reelected 
for generally two reasons. Of course policy makers may aim to stay in power 
for individual satisfaction, but even if policy makers pursue ideological goals 
reelection is important, as it facilitates policy makers achieving their goals. 
Policy makers are reluctant to risk their reputation. A decline of reputation of 
a party may decrease the loyalty of its supporters or may even split a party. 
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Hence if the popular i ty  of  the incumbent party  is high it can be expected to pur-  
sue its ideology goals. However,  the lower the popular i ty  the more an adminis-  
t rat ion is incl ined to behave in contrast  o its ideology. 
F rom the above it is clear that the pol icy problem is a rather compl icated one. 
An  incumbent party  not only faces trade-offs between economic variables, but 
it is addit ional ly  confronted with trade-offs  between ideological  goals and a re- 
election goal. These trade-offs raise a dynamic prob lem since, in trying to in- 
crease popular i ty,  pol icy makers must act in contrast o their ideology, which 
reduces their rel iabi l i ty or reputat ion.  
6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this article we have reported estimates of  the popular i ty  of  US presidents. 
We have tested two hypotheses: first, the conventional  score hypothesis that 
voters reward and punish administrat ions for good or bad per formance and, 
second, the issue hypothesis that voters base their decisions on the problems a
country faces. Empir ical  evidence turns out to be strongly in favour o f  the issue 
hypothesis.  Further  research will have to show the val idity of  the issue model  
for other countries. 
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Summary 
PRESIDENTIAL POPULARITY AND REPUTATION 
This paper eports on the results of an empirical study of relationships between the popularity of 
US presidents and economic variables. Traditionally, these relationships are based on the 
hypothesis that voters hold the incumbent President responsible for the economic situation. We 
derive an alternative specification ofpopularity, based on the hypothesis that political parties per- 
form better on different issues. Empirical evidence turns out to be strongly in favour of our 
hypothesis. Our findings have important implications for studies on government behaviour in 
which it is assumed that one of the objectives of administrations is to maximise votes. 
